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Recent changes in the overall NASA vision has resulted in further cost and schedule 
challenges for the Orion program. As a result, additional scrutiny has been focused on the 
use of new developments for hardware in the environmental control and life support 
systems. This paper will examine the Orion architecture as it is envisioned to support 
missions to the International Space Station and future exploration missions and determine 
what if any functions can be satisfied through the use of existing, heritage hardware designs. 
An initial evaluation of each component is included and where a heritage component was 
deemed likely further details are examined. Key technical parameters, mass, volume and 
vibration loads are a few of the specific items that are evaluated. Where heritage hardware 
has been identified that may be substituted in the Orion architecture a discussion of key 
requirement changes that may need to be made as well as recommendation to further 
evaluate applicability are noted.  
Nomenclature 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Recent changes in the overall political environment of the country has led to increasingly tight budgets 
throughout all government agencies and The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has not been 
immune. With increasing emphasis being placed on cost and schedule of the Orion Crew Exploration Program, 
efforts have been renewed to evaluate the use of new developments for hardware in the environmental control and 
life support systems (ECLS). The ECLS system is comprised of the air revitalization subsystem, the pressure control 
subsystem, the potable water subsystem, the fire detection and suppression subsystem and the active thermal control 
subsystem. With this breadth of functionality, it is not surprising that the ECLS is a significant portion of the cost for 
the overall program. Additionally, with the amount of complex hardware that comprises the ECLS, schedules for 
delivery of this hardware are often time in or near the critical path for the vehicle build. 
Previous studies have looked at the complexity (add reference to 2008 Apollo comparison paper) of the Orion 
ECLS and compared it to similar functionality used for the Apollo program. That paper concluded that sufficient 
evolution of requirements, heat loads and technology has occurred that the increase in mass and volume from Apollo 
to Orion is warranted. This paper will take a different approach to the historical assessment and will focus on the 
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potential use of heritage Shuttle, International Space Station or even X-38 ECLS hardware. After a brief summary of 
the current Orion architecture to set the context of the discussion, we will examine a top level look at all of the 
components and their potential for use on Orion. We will conclude the paper by doing a more involved analysis of 
three specific components, the positive pressure relief valve, the radiators and water tanks. 
II. System Overview 
While the current focus on the Orion program is on flight test 1 (OFT1) with ECLS functionality limited to only 
active thermal control components needed to support a similarly limited avionics and power suite, this assessment 
was done based on the ECLS functionality represented by the hardware configuration designated 606H. This 
configuration is designed to support a mission to the ISS or to the moon with functionality to include launch and 
return of up to 4 crew members. Further information on the details of this configuration can be found in [include 
reference to 2009? ECLS overview paper]. A schematic of this configuration is included in Figure #<check for LM 
approval for schematic dissemination>.  
III. Heritage Hardware Assessment 
The heritage hardware assessment followed a logical process by which the everyone of the baseline components 
were evaluated for technical applicability as well as cost.  First, we assessed the function represented by the 
component and asked the question “Could a heritage piece of Shuttle or ISS hardware be used to perform this 
function?” If the answer was “yes”, the specific heritage hardware was identified, as were any open issues relative to 
its use. If the answer was “no”, then an explanation of why not was noted. Second, we evaluated each function for 
whether it should be considered something that NASA should provide as government furnished equipment (GFE). 
This assessment considered the availability and suitability of the heritage hardware, the existing functional expertise 
and whether that expertise was resident within NASA, the desire of NASA to procure directly from vendors to 
preclude additional contractor overhead costs, and whether this function is already being provided for earlier 
missions. An example of the spreadsheet that was generated to collect all this data is included in Figure #. 
Once complete this assessment evaluated 132 components or groups of components (e.g., tubing was considered 
a group of components). These components could then be organized into five groups, the breakdown of these groups 
is shown in Figure #. The first category included 10 components where heritage hardware may exist and has the 
potential to be considered new NASA GFE. The second category includes the components where heritage hardware 
does not exist, but NASA has the expertise to develop it in-house as new GFE. Approximately 20 components fell 
into this second group. The third group of components contains the largest number of parts at 40 and this group is of 
hardware where no heritage hardware is available but NASA could potentially save the overhead costs of using a 
sub contractor by directly purchasing these parts directly from a vendor. The fourth group of components is the 30 
components that are required to support the Orion Flight Test 1 (OFT1) project and are therefore already in the 
design and development cycle. At this point it would impact the test schedule to change direction and attempt to use 
heritage hardware or build this hardware as GFE. The last group of 32 components were deemed to integral to the 
vehicle design or assembly to consider heritage hardware or GFE as an alternative. This group contains such items 
as tubing, ductwork and vents. The latter two categories will not be discussed further as no additional work was 
identified. 
Further examination of the 10 components that were identified as having potential heritage hardware substitutes 
were further evaluated. These components included the positive pressure relief valve (PPRV), and the ground 
support heat exchanger (GSE HX). For OFT1, we have already evaluated the ISS programs multipurpose logistics 
module positive pressure relief assembly (PPRA) and determined that for the unique requirements of that flight, the 
PPRA will provide sufficient functionality and was designed to adequate environments to cover the OFT1 flight 
profile. We have recently received agreement from the ISS program to transfer two PPRA’s from their inventories to 
the Orion project late summer 2011. Similarly, the Shuttle Freon to Freon ground support heat exchanger was 
evaluated for use on the OFT1 vehicle and has been deemed acceptable for use. Transfer of one of the Shuttle spare 
GSE HX’s is in process to support the July 2013 flight of OFT1. 
The remaining hardware in that category includes a cold plate bypass assembly which is a simple open/close 
valve that the prime contractor has yet to start procurement on and it is believed that any number of valves in the 
Shuttle and ISS fleet may support this function. The snorkel fan outlet valve and smoke detector have similar 
functionality to the ISS inter-module ventilation valve and the ISS smoke detectors. The cabin and hatch pressure 
equalization valves may also have ISS and shuttle valves that can be re-engineered with little effort to support Orion 
requirements. Finally, the potable water tanks may be of the right size that existing potable water tanks can be used. 
The team recommendation for this group of hardware is to pursue each of them further to determine if heritage 
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hardware does exist and can it be used for Orion purposes. However, there are reservations associated with the 
significantly higher vibro-acoustic loads that are being levied on Orion hardware, the availability of the parts for the 
electronic hardware, unique requirements from the exploration standpoint (e.g, radiation hardening), and the need to 
restart hardware production lines at vendors that may not longer be producing heritage hardware.  
The 20 components where no heritage hardware was identified but NASA has the expertise to develop them as 
new GFE include items that NASA was already providing as GFE and several new candidates. NASA was already 
providing the portable fire extinguisher, emergency masks, contingency gas analyzer, ammonia/hydrazine sensor for 
post landing and potable water bags. With the recent focus on the OFT1 mission and subsequent delay in the design 
and development of a significant portion of the ECLS system, there are additional components that are candidates to 
be provided as GFE. These include such things as the entire suit loop. This would include providing the carbon 
dioxide removal systems, regulators, fans, air monitoring, trace contaminant control and the liquid cooling garment 
water loop. In addition to the suit loop, the government could also provide LiOH for post landing, the potable water 
dispenser and the potty. The latter would mostly scavenge the extended duration orbiter system or possible an 
upgrade based on exploration technology development programs. In this area, we will be pursuing a detailed 
proposal for these items in order to determine what if any advantages may be evident in this path in terms of cost, 
schedule and technical resources. The proposal will be completed during fiscal year 2012. 
For the largest category of components where no heritage hardware was available it was often noted that the 
components themselves were already either a derivation from or using similar development tools as much of the 
heritage hardware. In this area hardware changes are driven mainly by the unique requirements of the Orion projects 
and in most cases due to the vibro-acoustic loads. For example, the sublimator used for lunar missions is a direct 
descendant of the sublimator used for the Apollo lunar module and subsequently for the X-38. Where it has been 
modified it is due to the aforementioned loads or limitations on mass and volume. Generally, the hardware in this 
category is best left to the prime contractor and their partners. However, it was noted that we need to continue 
working with the contractor groups to reduce costs wherever possible. 
In parallel to this assessment, 3 components were chosen to do a more in depth technical assessment. These 
components are discussed in the following sections. 
IV. Positive Pressure Relief Valve 
The X-38 utilized a PPRV that was an off-the-shelf, heritage spacecraft component supplied by Carlton (now 
Cobham).  It was almost identical with the Space Shuttle Orbiter and MPLM PPRV’s; minor differences are noted in 
Table # below.  Conceptually, it can be described as a mechanical relief valve combined with an upstream, motor-
driven butterfly valve.  The assembly includes a manual override to the motor driven section, micro-switch position 
sensors on the butterfly valve, and a visible position indicator on the manual override handle.   
The Orion PPRV is currently planned to be a customized design driven by unique Orion requirements, although 
based on the heritage Shuttle / MPLM configuration.  The major differences between the X-38 and Orion PPRV’s 
are the mass flow rates (Orion valve 5.3 times greater), leakage rates (Orion valve 1/4 as much), maximum design 
loads (Orion valve up to 60 percent greater), and factors of safety on design loads (Orion valve 43 percent greater 
for nominal loads).   
 
Mass Flow Rate The Space Shuttle / MPLM PPRV, also used on the X-38, has a full open mass flow rate of 
150 lbs air / hour, at a maximum pressure drop of 16.0 psid.  This value was determined by the Shuttle’s 14.7 psi 
cabin nitrogen pressure regulator, which has a full open flow rate of 125-150 lbs/hour.   
The much greater mass flow rate of the Orion PPRV, 800 lbs air/hour, is driven by the fixed fire suppression 
system for the avionics bays, which utilizes nitrogen gas as the fire suppressant.  Current Orion fire suppression 
requirements: 
a. Prohibit the use of halon, due to its very negative effects within the ISS life support system, even in very 
small trace amounts; 
b. Specify that fire suppression within the avionics bays be operable during lunar quiescence (when the vehicle 
is at least partially active, but uncrewed);  
c. Specify that fire suppression within the avionics bays be operable during ascent and entry (when the crew 
would be confined to their seats, and unable to connect a portable fire bottle to a fire port). 
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In addition, the following derived requirements for the Orion fire suppression system are based on general 
guidance from the safety and fire science communities: 
d. Once the system is activated, the oxygen concentration within the avionics bays should be reduced to less 
than 10.5 percent within 2 minutes; 
e. The oxygen concentration within the avionics bays should be held at less than 10.5 percent for 20 minutes; 
After much discussion early in the design process, nitrogen was selected as the suppressant rather than carbon 
dioxide, because the introduction of large quantities of carbon dioxide into the confined cabin volume would have 
negative consequences for crew respiration.   
It is also relevant that the avionics bays cannot be hermetically sealed off from the cabin, because 
a.  They must be able to vent internal pressure in the event of a cabin depressurization or fire event; and 
b. When the fire suppression system is activated, the effectiveness of the system will be much greater if the 
oxygen present is able to flow out of the avionics bays, as it is displaced by another gas. 
Although subject to future refinement, current estimates are that 7.9 pounds of nitrogen, introduced to the 
avionics bays within 2 minutes, is required in order for the Orion fixed fire suppression system to meet all 
requirements (including allocations for leakage, tank fill inaccuracy, etc).  The rapid introduction of this much 
additional nitrogen into the cabin, especially during the initial few seconds when the tank pressures and mass flow 
rates are very high, constitutes a mass flow rate of up to 800 lbs / hour during the first portion of the discharge 
period.  This is many times greater than the full flow rate of a failed open pressure regulator, the largest of which is 
the high-rate contingency oxygen regulator located in the MPR01 CEI, with a full open flow rate of approximately 
55 lbs/hour of oxygen.  Thus, the rates of mass introduction into the cabin from the fixed fire suppression system, 
and the associated cabin pressure increase, are what sizes the mass flow rate of the Orion PPRV.  The full flow rate 
of the Shuttle / MPLM / X-38 PPRV constitutes only 19 percent of the Orion requirement. 
 
Leakage In order to meet allocated leakage requirements, the Orion PPRV  needs to leak no more than 8.2 x 
10-5 scc/second of air (0.00492 scc/minute).  The Shuttle / MPLM / X-38 leak rate is 3.24 x 10-4 sccs of air 
(0.01944 scc/minute), approximately four times greater.  In other words, the Shuttle / MPLM / X-38 PPRV leaks 
four times more air than the Orion specification, and technically would not meet Orion requirements.  However, the 
difference in terms of the mass of air leaked is negligible.  Over a 210-day mission duration, the difference between 
the two leak rates is only an additional 0.012 lbs of air. 
 
Maximum Design Loads and Factors of Safety The Statement of Work for the X-38 PPRV specified the 
maximum static loads as 40g along any one axis, and 10 g on the two remaining (presumably orthogonal) axes.   
A factor of safety on the X-38 loads was not specified explicitly in the X-38 Statement of Work.  However, a 
dynamic loading environment equivalent to 140% of the static loading was specified.  In the opinion of 
NASA/Wayne Jermstad (email, 9/24/10), this is equivalent to a factor of safety of 1.4 on the static loads. Per the 
December 2009 Environmental Definitions Document, Orion static load requirements are  11.7g for nominal launch 
loads, and 64.2g for off-nominal launch loads.  These are the same for all three axes. Finally, Orion ECLSS has a 
factor of safety of 2.0 on nominal static structural loads, and 1.4 for off-nominal loads. 
The Orion static load requirements and factors of safety are greater due to the more severe accelerations that the 
spacecraft may experience, especially when failure scenarios are considered that should be survivable, such as 
launch aborts and failed-parachute landings. 
It is unclear whether the Shuttle / MPLM / X-38 PPRV design could meet Orion load requirements.  Load testing 
of those valves was apparently not performed to the higher Orion levels, and test units were apparently not tested to 
failure.  Therefore, at a minimum, re-testing and re-qualification to the higher Orion loads and factors of safety 
would be required. 
The largest driver for the size and weight of the Orion PPRV, and the primary reason that the X-38 design does 
not meet Orion requirements, is the necessary flow rate, which is driven by the gas introduced to the cabin by the 
fixed fire suppression system.  The higher Orion structural loads and factors of safety are, most likely, an additional 
factor in the cost and weight of the component. 
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Re-use of the Shuttle / MPLM / X-38 PPRV design on Orion would require both of the following: Re-design, or 
removal, of the Orion fixed fire suppression system and re-testing and re-qualification of the heritage PPRV design 
to the higher Orion structural loads and factors of safety. 
With regard to the fire suppression system, changing from nitrogen to a different inert gas, such as argon, would 
have little to no effect on the amount of gas required, and the resulting flow needed out of the PPRV. 
As mentioned earlier, the presence of Halon is strictly forbidden on all ISS visiting vehicles, with the exception 
of the Space Shuttle.  The problem here is that the high-temperature catalytic atmospheric revitalization processes in 
use on ISS break Halon down into some very hazardous byproducts, which are toxic at very low levels, and no 
known containment is sufficient to keep the Halon from leaking out in quantities that are measurable and significant, 
over long durations.  The only reason the Space Shuttle program received an exception was because Space Shuttles 
aren’t docked to ISS for very long, and it would have been too expensive for them to change their existing fire 
suppression design.  All other ISS visiting vehicles must avoid the use of Halon. 
Water foam would not work as a fire suppressant within avionics bays in zero-g, for several reasons.  The 
suppressant material must fill and/or coat the entire inner volume of the bay, including many oddly-shaped boxes 
and restricted flow passages, as well as the interiors of those avionics boxes.  This is difficult to achieve with a 
liquid.  There are also issues with clean-up after a release of water foam fire suppressant, and the effects of residue 
from the foam on electronics and electrical components.  
Some recent technology development work has been done on water mist as a fire suppressant, which utilizes very 
fine droplets of pure water, almost fog-sized, which behave more like a neutral gas for flow purposes.  This 
approach holds some promise, since the addition of a sufficient quantity of water mist to an avionics bay to suppress 
a fire would not have a large effect on the overall cabin pressure, and would leave no residual contamination.  
Investigation into this approach is on-going. 
Another option would be the deletion of fixed fire suppression from the Orion spacecraft.  The original Orion fire 
control strategy relied on a materials certification approach that would have certified all materials used in the 
avionics bays to be non-flammable at an oxygen concentration of 40 percent, 10 percent higher than the maximum 
cabin oxygen concentration of 30 percent.  Combined with minimal or no flame propagation within the avionics 
bays due to a lack of forced air flow there, this was seen as sufficient justification by the program for not requiring 
fire detection and suppression within the avionics bays.  However, this approach was not ultimately pursued, due to 
the significant time and expense associated with materials certification to the higher oxygen levels.  The ultimate 
problem was a lack of data.  Instead of determining what the flammability limits of each material really were, 
existing (legacy) materials and flammability certifications from the Shuttle and ISS programs had stopped at 30 
percent oxygen, so the data required for a timely adoption of the new Orion approach was not available.   
In the three-plus years since the proposed fire control strategy was dropped in mid-2007, additional work has 
been done on materials testing and certification to oxygen concentrations above 30 percent.  Given sufficient interest 
at the program level, it might be possible to revert to the original Orion fire suppression strategy, and delete fixed 
fire suppression from the design.  A very approximate estimate of the associated weight savings for the spacecraft 
would be on the order of 20 pounds, representing the mass of the nitrogen fire suppressant, tankage and tubing 
removed, and taking credit for a smaller PPRV. 
V. Radiators 
A similar comparison was done for the radiator systems used for the ISS and for shuttle. This comparison 
however is limited to the construction of the hardware. This is primarily due to the significant differences in heat 
loads required for each of the programs. More specifically, the Shuttle radiators are designed for a maximum heat 
load of 25kW and the ISS radiators are designed to provide approximately 11.7kW per orbital replacement unit with 
6 ORU’s nominally in operation providing a total capability of approximately  70kW total. Orion, in perspective, is 
expected to need no more than 5 to 7kW for the long duration lunar missions. Given this obvious disparity in heat 
rejection across the various vehicles was evaluated on mass per kW basis in order to provide a good comparison. 
Table # provides a comparison of salient requirements between the three programs.  
 
….complete table and provide synopsis. 
VI. Tanks/Accumulators 
A comparison of several tanks and accumulators was also completed. This assessment looked at the ISS recycle 
filter tank assembly (RFTA), the ISS waste water storage tank assembly (WSTA), the X-38 water tank, the Shuttle 
water spray boiler (WSB).  Table # includes a top level comparison of these tanks.  
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….complete table and provide synopsis. 
VII. Conclusion 
Given the current fiscal challenges of the agency, it is necessary to understand the  factors driving the cost of the 
current Orion systems. In order to better understand the difference between Orion hardware and previous spaceflight 
environmental systems two different activities were completed. The first activity was a detailed assessment was that 
compares the components necessary for the Orion ECLS system with heritage hardware performing similar 
functions. This assessment highlighted several areas where additional effort will be put into evaluating whether 
additional hardware can be provided by NASA as government furnished equipment. Completion of these proposals 
in FY12 will identify any cost, schedule or technical advantages to having NASA provide this function as GFE. The 
second activity included looking at the technical specifications of specific hardware to understand what may be 
driving significant cost or schedule differences for the Orion specific hardware. This activity highlighted that in 
some all areas, vibro-acoustic loads are significant higher than those levied on ISS or shuttle hardware while in other 
cases, heritage design is applicable to Orion and should be considered as a cost reduction exercise. 
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Figure 1 Example Heritage Hardware Spreadsheet 
 
 
Figure 2 Breakdown of Component Assessment 
 
Table 1 Comparison of PPRV Physical and Performance Characteristics 
 Shuttle / MPLM 
PPRV (minor 
differences noted) 
X-38 PPRV (same as  
Shuttle/MPLM, except as 
noted) 
Orion PPRV 
Weight 3.35 lbs (valve 
portion only) 
5.5 lbs (including 
Same as Shuttle / MPLM 8-10 lbs (estimated) 
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CM Active Thermal Control - UnpressurizRadiator Inlet Manifold Subassembly (RIM1) yes
HS already going to Moog 
which was used on ISS.  Cost 
is in cert for Orion. no
1) this is an OFT1 component 
and transition to NASA GFE 
would disrupt schedule.  2) 
Savings of wraps estimate at 
25% or $344K, but NASA 
would have to pick up 
procurement, integration, 
and certification effort at 
some cost. 1378
CM Active Thermal Control - UnpressurizRadiator Outlet Manifold Sub (ROM1) yes
HS already going to Moog 
which was used on ISS.  Cost 
is in cert for Orion. no
1) this is an OFT1 component 
and transition to NASA GFE 
would disrupt schedule.  2) 
Savings of wraps estimate at 
25% or $344K, but NASA 
would have to pick up 
procurement, integration, 
and certification effort at 
some cost. 1378
CM Active Thermal Control - UnpressurizCold Plate - Battery (CP07, CP08) no
Based on heritage designs, but 
very specific to Orion, and with 
PGW, heritage part numbers 
won't work no already in work for OFT1 855
CM Active Thermal Control - UnpressurizCold Plate - PDU C1/C2 (CP31, CP32) no
Based on heritage designs, but 
very specific to Orion, and with 
PGW, heritage part numbers 
won't work no already in work for OFT1 881
CM Active Thermal Control - UnpressurizCold Plate - PDU (CP29, CP30) no
Based on heritage designs, but 
very specific to Orion, and with 
PGW, heritage part numbers 
won't work no identical to CP31/32 
CM Active Thermal Control - UnpressurizAmmonia Boiler Subassembly (ABHX-1, ABHX-2) no
Shuttle (Fairchild) offline now.  
Would be challenging to 
reservice.  Obsolesence issues, 
and too big. no
OFT-1 time critical.  Don't 
have expertise, would only 
save CPE cost (12%), with 
some delta cost for NASA to 
assume this role.  Would still 
need to be Hamilton 
component 10070
Robert 
Todd 
Sullivan
:
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exterior non-thrust 
vent and cap 
assembly) 
Full-Flow Pressure 16.0 psia inlet, 0 
psia outlet (MPLM 
15.42 psia inlet) 
Same as Shuttle 15.55 psia inlet, 0 psia 
outlet 
Minimum Reseat 
Pressure 
MPLM 14.93 psid; 
Shuttle not specified 
15.5 psid  Not specified explicitly, 
but leakage requirement 
must be met at or below 
15.15 psid 
Full Open Mass Flow 
Rate 
150 lbs air / hour 
minimum 
Same as Shuttle 800 lbs air / hour 
minimum 
Power Draw (for 
butterfly valve motor) 
2.8 watts for 2 
seconds, 28 v dc  
Not specified Maximum of 10 watt-
seconds 
Leakage 3 x 10-4 scc/second 
(0.018 scc/minute) 
of helium, 
maximum, = 3.24 x 
10-4 sccs of air 
(0.01944 
scc/minute) 
Same as Shuttle 8.2 x 10-5 scc/second of 
air (0.00492 scc/minute) 
Design Loads  Static load factor for any 
single axis:  40g 
Simultaneous load factors 
for two remaining 
orthogonal axes:  10g 
Nominal launch:  11.7g 
Off-Nominal launch:  
64.2g 
(combination of steady-
state, quasi-steady state, 
and random vibration; 
same for all three axes) 
 
Factor of Safety on 
Design Loads 
 1.4 2.0 for nominal, 1.4 for 
off-nominal 
 
 
 
Table 2 Comparison of Program Water Tanks 
 ISS  
RFTA  
ISS  
WSTA  
X-38  
Water Tank  
Shuttle  
WSB Tank  
Orion  
Water Tank  
Weight   100 lbs  61 lbs   57 lbs  
Max Design Pres  35 psig  30 psig     
Total Volume    6699 in3   6377 in3  
Fluid Capacity   832 in3     
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Vibration Loads  9.47 g (rms)  6.3 g(rms)   f 0.14 g2/Hz 
from 60 to 150 
Hz.  
December 2009 
EDD + 6 dB is 
28.0 g2/Hz from 
50 to 125 Hz  
Design Loads      32.1 g  
 
